REAL PROPERTY-PURCHASER OF ONE SPOUSE'S INTEREST IN AN
ESTATE BY THE ENTIRETIES IS NOT ENTITLED TO PARTITION
AS A MATTER OF RIGHT IN NEW JERSEY-Newman v. Chase, 70

N.J. 254, 359 A.2d 474 (1976).
In 1972 Arthur D. Chase, co-owner of a family home, filed a
voluntary petition in bankruptcy.' During proceedings to discharge
Chase's debts, Howard C. Newman purchased a trustee's deed conveying to him all of Chase's interest in that home. 2 Despite his
purchase, Newman was precluded from taking possession because the

Chases subsequently commenced occupancy of the premises on the
basis of the wife's interest in the property. 3 As a result, Newman
instituted suit seeking either a partition or a partition sale of the

property, as well as "an accounting from Mrs. Chase for one-half the
rental value of the premises" accruing from the date of his allegedly
4
wrongful exclusion.
I Newman

v. Chase, 70 N.J. 254, 258-59, 359 A.2d 474, 476 (1976).
at 257, 259, 359 A.2d at 476. Newman purchased Mr. Chase's interest in the
property for $1,000. Id. at 259, 359 A.2d at 476.
3 Id. at 258-59, 359 A.2d at 476. Although the Chases took title to the property in
question in November of 1971, they postponed occupancy of the premises until January
5, 1973. Id. The court stated that the reason for the delay, in commencing occupancy was
not clear. Id. at 259 & n.2, 359 A.2d at 476. During the intervening period, Chase filed
his petition in bankruptcy and his interest was sold to Newman on November 20, 1972.
Id. at 259, 359 A.2d at 476. Newman became a tenant in common with Mrs. Chase. Id. at
258, 359 A.2d at 476.
4 Id. at 258-59, 359 A.2d at 476; see Brief of Defendants-Appellants at D4a, Newman
v. Chase, 70 N.J. 254, 359 A.2d 474 (1976). A suit for partition is an action to sever the
possessory right in an undivided whole which cotenants share. See Golick v. Lukus, 89
N.J. Super. 467, 473, 215 A.2d 551, 555 (App. Div. 1965). Where possible a physical
division of the common property will be accomplished. If, in the discretion of the trial
judge, such a division cannot be made without prejudice, New Jersey courts are empowered, by N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:56-2 (West 1952), to order a partition sale of the
common property and a distribution of the proceeds. Id. §§ 2A:56-2, -11.
By purchasing Mr. Chase's interest in the property, Mr. Newman had become a
tenant in common, with Mrs. Chase, of the estate for the joint lives of husband and
wife, and had also succeeded to Mr. Chase's right of survivorship. Newman v. Chase, 70
N.J. 254, 260, 359 A.2d 474, 477 (1976). He sought partition solely on the basis of his
status as tenant in common of the joint life estate. Id. Had partition of the fee, as opposed to the life estate, been sought, it would have been denied. See Dvorken v. Barrett, 100 N.J. Super. 306, 309, 241 A.2d 841, 843 (App. Div.) (husband's trustee in bankruptcy denied partition sale of fee), aff'd per curiam, 53 N.J. 20, 247 A.2d 674 (1968).
Newman limited his claim for an accounting to the period between January 5, 1973,
and the date of the trial, rather than from his November 20, 1972 purchase date. 70 N.J.
at 259, 359 A.2d at 476. A necessary precondition to an action for an accounting between cotenants is wrongful exclusion or ouster. See note 65 infra. In view of the fact
that the Chases did not occupy the property until January 5, 1973, 70 N.J. at 258-59, 359
2

Id.

NOTES

On plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, the trial court
"order[ed] a partition sale of the estate for the joint lives of the defendants, husband and wife," 5 but noted that the rights of survivorship were not affected. 6 On direct appeal, 7 the Supreme Court of
New Jersey in Newman v. Chase8 reversed and remanded. 9 The majority, through an opinion by Justice Mountain, held that, despite the
fact that Mr. Newman and Mrs. Chase are considered tenants in
common of the joint life estate, "partition should not be available as a
matter of right" 10 and should be granted only as a matter of equitable
discretion. 1 As the successor to Mr. Chase's possessory interest in
the property, Newman, however, was granted an accounting for onehalf of the fair rental value of the property, subject to a set-off of a
pro rata share of certain expenses paid by Mrs. Chase during the
12
period of the accounting.
Central to the holding in Newman v. Chase is an understanding
of the common law estate that existed between the Chases and from
which Newman derived his interest.' 3 At common law, a conveyance
A.2d at 476, Newman apparently could not have qualified for an accounting prior to that
date.
For a discussion of the equitable relief historically available to the successor in
interest of an individual tenant by the entirety, see notes 59-77 infra and accompanying
text.
5 Newman v. Chase, 70 N.J. 254, 258, 359 A.2d 474, 476 (1976). Hereinafter, the
term "joint life estate" will be employed when referring to the estate for the joint lives
of husband and wife who hold or have held the property in question as tenants by the
entirety. Even in situations where the interest of one spouse has been transferred to a
third party, the lives which determine the rights of survivorship are those of the spouses.
See id. at 260, 359 A.2d at 477.
6 Id. at 259, 359 A.2d at 476. While granting the requested relief, the trial court expressed its dissatisfaction with the rule of Schulz v. Ziegler, 80 N.J. Eq. 199, 83 A. 968
(Ct. Err. & App. 1912). That decision had granted partition of a joint life estate to a
third-party successor to an individual spouses' interest in an estate by the entirety, but
the court noted that rights of survivorship were unaffected. Id. at 202, 83 A. at 969; see
Newman v. Chase, 70 N.J. 254, 258, 359 A.2d 474, 476 (1976). For a more detailed
discussion of Schulz, see notes 70-74 infra and accompanying text.
7 While an appeal was pending in the appellate division, the defendants' motion for
direct certification was granted by the New Jersey supreme court. Newman v. Chase, 70
N.J. 254, 258, 359 A.2d 474, 476 (1976). In New Jersey, motions for direct certification
may be made to the supreme court pursuant to N.J.R. 2:12-2.
8 70 N.J. 254, 359 A,2d 474 (1976).
9 Id. at 258, 359 A.2d at 476.
lo Id.

at 257, 261, 359 A.2d at 475-77.

11Id. at 266, 359 A.2d at 480.
12 Id. at 266-68, 359 A.2d at 480-81.
1a At common law there were four various types of concurrent estates. Estates held
in common differed from individual estates only in that cotenants shared a unity of
possession. That is to say that each enjoyed a right to possession of the undivided whole
estate. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 179, 191. Estates in joint tenancy differ from
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of realty to a husband and wife resulted in a unique form of concurrent ownership known as tenancy by the entirety.' 4 Husband and
wife were regarded as one entity and, therefore, as transferees in
a conveyance they were incapable of taking separate interests or
shares.'5 Rather, both owned the entire estate 1 6 and "upon the death
17
of one, the whole estate still belonged as before to the survivor.'
Although the precise rationale underlying the development of such an
estate is in dispute,1 8 the overriding concept of male dominance
estates in common in that the joint tenants share four unities-interest, title, time and
possession, i.e., "joint-tenants have one and the same interest, accruing by one and the
same conveyance, commencing at one and the same time, and held by one and the
same undivided possession." Id. at *180. Arising out of the unities of interest and possession is the principal characteristic of a joint tenancy: the right of survivorship. Id. at
*182-84. For a discussion of the right of survivorship, see note 17 infra.
14 4 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY
620, at 683 (rev. ed. 1970); 4 G. THOMPSON,
REAL PROPERTY § 1784, at 49 (repl. ed. 1961). Traditionally, the four unities of joint
tenancy-title, time, possession and interest-together with the additional unity of husband and wife, are required to create a tenancy by the entirety. 4 R. POWELL, supra,
620, at 683; see 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.6, at 23-25 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952);
note 13 supra.
15 1.BAXTER, MARITAL PROPERTY § 1:1, at 3-4 (1973).
16 Id. at 3; 4 G. THOMPSON, supra note 14, § 1784, at 48 & n.I. The common law
concept of marital unity was primarily responsible for those characteristics which distinguish tenancy by the entirety from joint tenancy. See J. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW OF PROPERTY 95-96 (2d ed. 1975), where the author states that
tenants by the entirety were seised per tout et non per my, joint tenants
were seised per my et per tout. This is shorthand for saying that the former own
the whole interest collectively but not any individual share whereas the latter
own both the whole interest and a share. This mysticism is clarified by the
practical consequences: the estate by the entireties could not be partitioned
except by the voluntary act of both parties or by divorce, nor could the estate
be defeated by an act on the part of a single spouse, i.e., by voluntary conveyance
of his interest or by a sale on execution to reach his assets; the joint tenancy
could be partitioned and was, in fact, severed by a voluntary or involuntary
conveyance by a single party.
Id. at 96 (emphasis added in part).
17 Phipps, Tenancy by Entireties, 25 TEMP. L.Q. 24, 24-25 (1951). The nature of this
right of survivorship in a tenancy by the entirety is significantly different from that in a
joint tenancy. In a joint tenancy, upon the death of one cotenant, the surviving cotenant
actually succeeds to the decedent's interest in the estate. In a tenancy by the entirety,
however, ownership of the entire estate is vested in a unit composed of husband and
wife and, upon the death of one spouse, the survivor represents the ownership unit. As
a result, there is no increase (jus accrescendi) in the surviving cotenant's estate as occurs when a joint tenant survives. See, e.g., Den ex dem. Hardenbergh v. Hardenbergh,
10 N.J.L. 42, 46 (Sup. Ct. 1828); I. BAXTER, supra note 15, § 1:1, at 4.
18Compare 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 14, § 6.6, at 23 with
Honigman, Tenancy by Entirety in Michigan, 5 MICH. ST. B.J. 196, 199 (1926). There is
strong support for the theory that tenancy by the entirety was a natural product of common law concepts of marital unity. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra, § 6.6 at 23;
see 4 G. THOMPSON, supra note 14, § 1784, at 47, 48 n.1.
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permeated its evolution,

19

thus rendering unimportant the fact that

the wife as well as the husband was technically seized of the entire
estate. 20 All right to possession and use of the property was vested in
the husband. This had the practical effect of limiting a wife's interest
21
in an estate held by the entirety to her right of survivorship.
The subordinate status of women with respect to property rights
during coverture continued to obtain in the majority of American
jurisdictions until the passage of Married Women's Property Acts during the nineteenth century. 22 These statutes, which expressly guarantee to married women property rights equivalent to those enjoyed by
A tenable argument has been made, however, that the existence of the concept of
marital unity does not adequately explain the indestructible right of survivorship-the
most distinguishing characteristic of the estate. Honigman, supra at 196, 198. Honigman
notes that, as a general rule, the common law concept of marital unity was designed to
enhance the rights of the husband and that a restriction such as that imposed by the
indestructible right of survivorship was not only unique but also inconsistent with a
general policy designed to give a husband complete control of the property of his wife.
See id. at 197-98. He concludes that "the estate by the entirety was in its origin a mere
joint tenancy, adorned with the disabilities of coverture and a fortuitously conceived
notion of an indestructible right of survivorship." Id. at 199; see Ritter, A Criticism of
the Estate by the Entirety, 5 FLA. L. REV. 153, 154-57 (1952).
The distinction between the view that tenancy by the entirety is the result of the
concept of marital unity and the view that its incidents were rather a function of the
husband's dominant legal role becomes important when considering what character, if
any, an estate by the entirety takes in a jurisdiction with a married women's property
statute eliminating the husband's dominant legal position. See Honigman, supra at 201.
For a discussion of the effect of Married Women's Property Acts upon the tenancy by
the entirety, see id. at 282-84; notes 26-27 infra and accompanying text.
19 See 4 R. POWELL, supra note 14,
623, at 695; Phipps, supra note 17, at 24;
Ritter, supra note 18, at 157.
20 See 4 R. POWELL, supra note 14,
623, at 695-96; Ritter, supra note 18, at 157.
21 4 R. POWELL, supra note 14,
623, at 695-96; Ritter, supra note 18, at 157.
Although a husband's right to possession was exclusive, such a right was not considered
an incident of the estate by the entirety itself. Rather, it was a function of his status as
his wife's guardian, analogous to his "estate jure uxoris in lands solely owned by [his]
wife." C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 230 (1962) (emphasis in original).
It is only since the elimination of the husband's possessory rights in the property of
his wife by virtue of the Married Women's Property Acts of the nineteenth century that
courts have been confronted with questions concerning a wife's equal possessory interest in an estate by the entirety. See Phipps, supra note 17, at 27-28. For a discussion
of the New Jersey statute and its construction, see notes 28-41 infra and accompanying
text.
22 Phipps, supra note 17, at 24-27. As used in this Note, "Married Women's Property Act" is a generic term referring to a type of reform legislation enacted in virtually
all American states during the second half of the ninteenth century. See id. at 27. Although the language of the several statutes is not uniform, they generally provide married women with "full dominion and control of their separate property" and endow
them "with wide powers to contract, sue, and be sued with respect thereto." Id.
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single women, 23 are generally regarded as having "destroy[ed] the
wife's coverture disabilities and the husband's dominant rights." 24 As
a result of these laws, the collateral support for an estate by the
entireties, which traditionally was drawn from the concept of male
dominance, was lost, 25 causing this tenancy to become a virtual legal
anomaly and prompting several jurisdictions to eliminate completely
this type of estate. 26 Even among those jurisdictions which have retained this form of concurrent ownership there is a lack of consensus
27
as to the relative rights and abilities of the respective parties.
In 1852, New Jersey adopted a Married Women's Property
Act. 2 8 Although this Act did not directly address tenancy by the entirety, it did eventually lead to significant alterations of the common
law incidents of this estate. In Buttlar v. Rosenblath, 2 9 for example,
the court of errors and appeals considered the impact of the Act upon
23 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:2-12 (West 1968); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 3-301
(McKinney 1964); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, §§ 32.1, 64 (Purdon 1965).
24 Phipps, supra note 17, at 27; see 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 14,
§ 6.6, at 29; 4 R. POWELL, supra note 14,
623, at 697; notes 28-41 infra and accompanying text.
25 See Phipps, supra note 17, at 25.
26 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 14, § 6.6, at 31-32; see id. at 31-32 nn.

32-34; 1. BAXTER, supra note 15, § 2.2, at 10-13 & nn.22-33; 4 R. POWELL, supra note 14,
621, at 684-85 & nn.1-7; Phipps, supra note 17, at 32-33 & nn.23-28. For a comparison
of the various American views with respect to tenancy by the entirety and a compilation
of pertinent case law (through 1950) by jurisdiction, see id. at 46-57.
27 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 14, § 6.6, at 28-30; 4 R. POWELL,
supra note 14,
623, at 695-706. For example, Massachusetts, Michigan, and North
Carolina adopt the view "that tenancy by the entireties, not being specifically mentioned, was not affected in any way by the Married Women's Acts or other legislation
dealing with general marital relations, and therefore it still exist[s] as at common law."
Phipps, supra note 17, at 28-31 & nn.10, 13-19, & 21. Other jurisdictions have taken the
position that the statutes vitiated only the common law concept of the husband's legal
dominance of his wife and, therefore, the tenancy continues to exist independent of that
concept. Id. at 31-32. Even within this latter group there exists a variety of opinions
with respect to the incidents of the estate, and modem courts have tailored the tenancy
to meet the needs of their particular jurisdictions. See id. at 27-35.
28 Act of Mar. 25, 1852, ch. 171, 1852 N.J. Acts 407. The original statute has been
condensed and codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 37:2-12 to -15 (West 1968). Section 37:212 provides that
[t]he real and personal property of a woman which she owns at the time of
her marriage, and the real and personal property, and the rents, issues and profits thereof, of a married woman, which she receives or obtains in any manner
whatever after her marriage, shall be her separate property as if she were a
feme sole.
Id. § 37:2-12.
2942 N.J. Eq. 651, 9 A. 695 (Ct. Err. & App. 1887), aff'g in part, rev'g in part 7
N.J.L.J. 143 (Ch. 1884).
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tenancy by the entirety. 30 This court stated that "the legislation . . .
ha[d] not destroyed the common law effect of a conveyance to husband and wife and converted it into a tenancy in common"; 3 1 rather,
the Act had extinguished the husband's right to possess and enjoy his
wife's interest in property during their joint lives. 3 2 Thus, under
Buttlar, a tenant by the entirety, be it husband or wife, held both a
possessory interest in one-half of the estate for their joint lives and
33
his or her common law right of survivorship.
30

In Buttlar, certain real property had been conveyed to the Buttlars as husband

and wife. They subsequently conveyed this property to a third party, Bier, in order to
avoid the debts of Mr. Buttlar. The husband's creditor, Rosenblath, in attempting to
recover money owed to her, challenged as fraudulent the conveyance of property to
Bier and his subsequent transfer of the property back to Mrs. Buttlar. Rosenblath v.
Buttlar, 7 N.J.L.J. at 143. Both the court of chancery and the court of errors and appeals
found the conveyance to Bier fraudulent. 42 N.J. Eq. at 652, 9 A. at 696; 7 N.J.L.J. at
144-45. The two courts disagreed, however, with respect to the nature of the estate held
hy the Buttlars. Compare 42 N.J. Eq. at 655, 657, 9 A. at 697-98 with 7 N.J.L.J. at
144-45. Having determined that they held by the entirety, the court of errors and appeals implied that only the husband's interest would be subject to levy and execution in
satisfaction of his individual debts. See 42 N.J. Eq. at 656, 9 A. at 698.
3i 42 N.J. Eq. at 655, 9 A. at 697.
32 Id. at 657, 9 A. at 698; see id. at 653-56, 9 A. at 696-98. The Married Women's
Property Act did not dest 'oy tenancy by the entirety, but rather guaranteed to a wife a
one-half interest in possession. Id. at 655-57, 9 A. at 697-98. The statute was construed
as "operat[ing] upon the enjoyment, and not upon the character, quantum or extent of
[an estate]" conveyed to a married woman, or to her and her husband. Id. at 653, 9 A.
at 696-97 (emphasis in original). See also King v. Greene, 30 N.J. 395, 411-12, 153 A.2d
49, 59-60 (1959).
33 42 N.J. Eq. at 656-57, 9 A. at 698. This construction of the statute's impact upon
tenancy by the entirety was the result of a rather tortured evolutionary process of decisional law. Shortly after passage of the Act, the Supreme Court of New Jersey decided
Washburn & Campbell v. Burns, 34 N.J.L. 18 (Sup. Ct. 1869), and utilizing prior common
law principles, determined that a husband could burden property held by the entirety
with a mechanics' lien. Id. at 20. While the court was aware of the Act, id. at 21, it
apparently felt that the statute had not affected the husband's common law right to use
and encumber property held by the entirety, see id. at 20, and, therefore, avoided making a definitive statement regarding the spouses' respective rights in light of the new
statute, id. at 21. Subsequent to Washburn, lower courts, recognizing the applicability of
the Act, held that a wife was entitled to equal use and enjoyment of property conveyed
to husband and wife. E.g., See v. Zabriskie, 28 N.J. Eq. 422, 428-29 (Prerog. Ct. 1877);
Kip v. Kip, 33 N.J. Eq. 213, 215-16 (Ch. 1880).
Misreading these cases, the court of chancery in Rosenblath v. Buttlar construed the
Act as abolishing tenancy by the entirety in New Jersey. 7 N.J.L.J. at 144. In reversing
the trial court, the court of errors and appeals summarized its constrnction of the Act
and its impact upon estates by the entirety, stating
that the just construction of this legislation, and the one in harmony with its
spirit and general purpose, is that the wife is endowed with the capacity, during the joint lives, to hold in her possession, as a single female, one-half the
estate, in common with her husband, and that the right of survivorship still
exists as at common law.
42 N.J. Eq. at 657, 9 A. at 698.
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In reaching its decision, the Buttlar court was required to deal
with the issue of an individual spouse's ability to alienate his interest
in an estate held by the entirety 34 -an issue .that has plagued the
courts for many years. 3 5 Following the common law rule, New Jersey
initially took the position that "[n]either [husband nor wife could]
separately or without the assent of the other, dispose of or convey
away any part" of such an estate. 3 6 Subsequently, the view developed
that although a spouse was without the power to effect a unilateral
disposition of his or her interest in any manner that might prejudice
the rights of the other spouse, a husband was free, within this constraint and without the consent of his wife, to alienate his own
interest.3 7 After the Buttlar court's holding that tenants by the entirety were, in effect, tenants in common of the joint life estate,38 a
husband and wife enjoyed equality with respect to their rights of possession and enjoyment. 3 9 Moreover, each spouse was able to transfer

'4
See
35

42 N.J. Eq. at 655-57, 9 A. at 697-98.
See, e.g., King v. Greene, 30 N.J. 395, 401, 153 A.2d 49, 53 (1959); Washburn &
Campbell v. Bums, 34 N.J.L. 18, 19 (Sup. Ct. 1869); Den ex dem. Wyckoff v. Gardner,
20 N.J.L. 556, 559 (Sup. Ct. 1846); Servis v. Dorn, 76 N.J. Eq. 241, 243-45, 76 A. 246,
247 (Ch. 1909).
36 Den ex dem. Hardenbergh v. Hardenbergh, 10 N.J.L. 42, 45 (Sup. Ct. 1828). This
general common law rile may be traced to Blackstone, who stated that
if an &state in fee be given to a man and his wife, . . . being considered as one
person in law, they cannot take the estate by moieties, but both are seized of
the entirety, per tout, et non per my: the consequence of which is, that neither
the husband nor the wife can dispose of any part without the assent of the
other, but the whole must remain to the survivor.
G. CHASE, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 361 (4th ed.
1921) (emphasis in original).
37 E.g., Den ex dem. Wyckoff v. Gardner, 20 N.J.L. 556, 560 (Sup. Ct. 1846) (Carpenter, J.); id. at 563 (Nevius, J.). The Gardner court held that while the husband could
not convey an estate by the entirety in a manner prejudicing his wife's right of survivorship, he could mortgage, alienate, or devise his interest, including the right to exclusive
possession. Id. at 560 (Carpenter, J.); id. at 563 (Nevius, J.). See also King v. Greene, 30
N.J. 395, 402-04, 153 A.2d 49, 53-55 (1959).
38 42 N.J. Eq. at 657, 9 A. at 698. The Buttlar decision was followed by a line of
cases which confirmed the alienability, both voluntary and involuntary, of the husband's
interest in the joint life estate when the property in question was held by the entirety.
See, e.g., Zubler v. Porter, 98 N.J.L. 444, 446-47, 120 A. 194, 195-96 (Ct. Err. & App.
1923); Wortendyke v. Rayot, 88 N.J. Eq. 331, 332-33, 102 A. 2, 3 (Ct. Err. & App. 1917);
Schulz v. Ziegler, 80 N.J. Eq. 199, 202-03, 83 A. 968, 969 (Ct. Err. & App. 1912); Bilder
v. Robinson, 73 N.J. Eq. 169, 172-75, 67 A. 828, 829-31 (Ch. 1907).
While it is clear that in Buttlar the wife retained her common law right of survivorship, 42 N.J. Eq. at 657, 9 A. at 698, the court did not address the question of whether
the husband would retain his right of survivorship if his interest were subjected to an
execution sale, see 73 N.J. Eq. at 175, 67 A. at 830; note 42 infra.
'9 See Bilder v. Robinson, 73 N.J. Eq. 169, 174-75, 67 A. 828, 830-31 (Ch. 1907).
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his or her individual interest in the joint life estate4 ° "to a third party
who thereby became a tenant in common for the joint lives" in the
conveying spouse's place. 4 ' Despite the breadth of the Buttlar holding, a unilateral conveyance by a spouse remained subject to the New
Jersey common law limitation that a unilateral transfer would not be
permitted to prejudice the rights of the non-conveying spouse, i.e.,
42
the right of survivorship.
The question of whether a conveyance of a spouse's entire interest included merely one-half of the joint life estate or the right of
40 The Buttlar court stated that, as a result of the Married Women's Property Act, a
married woman had a right to "possess and enjoy [her real property] as fully as if she
[were] a single woman." 42 N.J. Eq. at 656, 9 A. at 698. Among the rights enjoyed at
common law by single women, but not by married women, were the right to hold realty
and the right to contract. 1 F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 482-85 (2d ed. 1898). Generally, the ability to contract and the ability to convey
real property are coextensive. E. HOPKINS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY § 237, at 381 (1896). Having been granted property rights equivalent to those
of a single woman, it is clear that a wife as well as a husband was capable of alienating
her interest in the joint life estate. King v. Greene, 30 N.J. 395, 412, 153 A.2d 49, 59
(1959); see 73 HARV. L. REV. 792, 792 (1960); cf. Zubler v. Porter, 98 N.J.L. 444, 445-46,
120 A. 194, 195 (Ct. Err. & App. 1923) (wife made effective conveyance of her individual
interest in joint life estate as well as interest she held as trustee).
41 Schulz v. Ziegler, 80 N.J. Eq. 199, 201-02, 83 A. 968, 969 (Ct. Err. & App.
1912);
accord, Zubler v. Porter, 98 N.J.L. 444, 446, 120 A. 194, 196 (Ct. Err. & App. 1923); see
Wortendyke v. Ravot, 88 N.J. Eq. 331, 332, 102 A. 2, 3 (Ct. Err. & App. 1917).
The effect of the court's decision in Buttlar was the creation of a situation whereby
the purchaser at an execution sale might become a tenant in common of the joint life
estate with the wife; however, it was not until the Schulz decision that the exact status
of a grantee of the husband's interest was determined by a New Jersey court of last
resort. See 80 N.J. Eq. at 201-02, 83 A. at 969; cf. Bilder v. Robinson, 73 N.J. Eq. 169,
175, 67 A. 828, 830 (Ch. 1907) (relief granted to purchaser of husband's interest on
theory thaf he had succeeded to husband's interest in common in joint life estate).
Bilder is discussed at notes 67-69 infra and accompanying text.
42 See 42 N.J. Eq. at 655-57, 9 A. at 697-98. While determining that tenants by the
entirety were essentially tenants in common of the joint life estate, the Buttlar court
conformed its decision to the New Jersey common law rule. See id. Deciding the case
as narrowly as possible, the court did not state whether an individual spouse's right of
survivorship might be conveyed without prejudicing the other spouse's interest. See id.
Several courts followed Buttlar, recognizing the common law restriction, but refusing to
decide whether the right of survivorship could be included in such a conveyance. See,
e.g., Zubler v. Porter, 98 N.J.L. 444, 447, 120 A. 194, 196 (Ct. Err. & App. 1923); Schulz
v. Ziegler, 80 N.J. Eq. 199, 201-02, 83 A. 968, 969 (Ct. Err. & App. 1912); Bilder v.
Robinson, 73 N.J. Eq. 169, 173-75, 67 A. 828, 830-31 (Ch. 1907).
This restriction on the ability of a spouse to alienate unilaterally his interest in an
estate by the entirety still exists in New Jersey. See Silver Bay Homes v. Herrmann, 128
N.J. Super. 114, 118, 319 A.2d 243, 245 (App. Div. 1974). However, the court in King v.
Greene, 30 N.J. 395, 153 A.2d 49 (1959), stated definitively that an individual spouse's
right of survivorship, as well as his or her interest in the joint estate, could be alienated
freely without prejudicing the rights of the other spouse. Id. at 412, 153 A.2d at 60. For
a discussion of King v. Greene, see notes 43-58 infra and accompanying text.
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survivorship as well was not decided until the seminal decision of
King v. Greene. a3 In King a widow brought an action for possession
and mesne profits against the successors in interest to a purchaser of
her own interest in an estate by the entirety. 44 The plaintiff contended that a sheriff's deed, which purported to convey "all [her]
right, title and interest,"4 5 had, in fact, conveyed only her interest in
the estate for the joint lives of the spouses, and not her right of
survivorship. 4 6 Mrs. King claimed that, having thus retained her
right of survivorship at the time of the execution sale, she was entitled to ownership of the fee as a result of her husband's intervening
death. 4 7 The trial court granted her motion for summary judgment. 48 Reversing the lower court, the supreme court rejected the
plaintiff's theory and concluded that a conveyance of an individual
spouse's right, title and interest in an estate held by the entirety
included not only that spouse's interest in the joint life estate, but
also his or her right of survivorship.4 9 This conclusion rested on two
4330 N.J. 395, 399, 153 A.2d 49, 51 (1959), noted in 73 HARv. L. REV. 792 (1960); 58
MICH. L. REV. 601 (1960); 14 RUTGERS L. REV. 457 (1960); 5 VILL. L. REV. 154 (1959).
4430 N.J. at 397-98, 153 A.2d at 51. Title to the property in question originally had
been vested solely in the plaintiff, Mrs. King. Her husband brought an action against
her, obtaining a money judgment and an order that Mrs. King convey title "to herself
and her husband as tenants by the entirety." Id. at 398, 153 A.2d at 51. She never made
the conveyance t)nt the order was recorded and Mrs. King and her husband became
tenants by the entirety by operation of law. The execution of her interest was made
subsequently in satisfaction of her husband's money judgment. The purchaser at the
execution sale and Mr. King joined in a conveyance to a Mr. Smock who in turn conveyed
his interest to the defendants, Joseph and Mabel Greene. Id.
45

Id.

46 Id. The King court reasoned that if a wife's interest at common law was limited to
her right of survivorship, "[n]o prejudice would result .. .by the husband's alienation
of his right of survivorship," because "[i]f he predeceased her, she would take a fee." Id.
at 404, 153 A.2d at 55.
In stating its conclusion, the court noted that what was being conveyed was actually
an individual spouse's interest in the fee simple, subject to defeasance in the event that
the conveying spouse predeceased the non-conveying spouse. Id. at 406, 153 A.2d at 56.
By viewing the conveyance in this light, the court was able to avoid a conflict with a
statutory prohibition on levy and execution sales of contingent estates, found in N.J.
REV. STAT. § 46:3-7 (1937) (current version of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:3-7 (West 1940)),
on levy and execution sales of contingent estates. See 30 N.J. at 406-07, 153 A.2d at 56.
47 30 N.J. at 406-07, 153 A.2d at 56.
48Id. at 398-99, 153 A.2d at 51. The order of the trial court declared that Mrs. King
was owner of the property in fee simple, that she was "entitled to mesme profits," and
that the property was not encumbered by a mortgage given by the Greenes. Id. (emphasis in original).
49Id. at 412-13, 153 A. 2d at 59-60. In so holding, the supreme court was required
to overrule two lower court decisions, Zanzonico v. Zanzonico, 24 N.J. Misc. 153, 46
A.2d 565 (Sup. Ct. 1946), and Dworan v. Miloszewski, 17 N.J. Super. 269, 85 A.2d 550
(Camden County Ct. 1952). 30 N.J. at 412, 153 A.2d at 60. Both cases had held that
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premises: 1) "a husband could alienate his right of survivorship at
common law," provided that the alienation did not prejudice the
rights of the wife; 50 2) New Jersey's Married Women's Property Act
51
had endowed the wife with the same ability.
Since King v. Greene, it has been settled law in New Jersey that
both the interest in the estate for the joint lives of the spouses and
the right of survivorship of either spouse are alienable, voluntarily or
involuntarily. 52 In either situation, the third-party grantee becomes a
tenant in common with the remaining spouse for the joint lives of the
spouses. 53 Should the conveying spouse survive the non-conveying
spouse, the third party then succeeds to whatever interest the con54
veying spouse would have been entitled to by way of survivorship.
King, while widely regarded as a landmark decision, 55 did not
effect any fundamental changes in New Jersey concepts of tenancy by
the entirety. The alienability of an individual spouse's interest in the
joint life estate was established law prior to 1959.56 King v. Greene
merely added that, in addition to being able to alienate such an interest, an individual spouse could also alienate his or her right of
survivorship without affecting the other spouse's interest in the
estate. 57 While King did clarify the law in New Jersey concerning the
although each spouse's interest in the joint life estate was alienable, their respective
rights of survivorship were not. 24 N.J. Misc. at 159-60, 46 A.2d at 569; see 17 N.J.
Super. at 274-77, 85 A.2d at 553-54.
5030 N.J. at 412, 153 A.2d at 60; see id. at 411, 153 A.2d at 59. At common law, the
wife's interest in an estate by the entirety was, for practical purposes, limited to her
right of survivorship. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
si 30 N.J. at 412, 153 A.2d at 60. The court reasoned that since the Married
Women's Property Act made the rights of the wife coextensive with those of her husband, she was also subject to "equal disabilities" and, therefore, "the judgement creditors of either spouse may levy and execute upon their separate rights of survivorship." Id.
52 See, e.g., Silver Bay Homes v. Herrmann, 128 N.J. Super. 114, 117, 319 A.2d 243,
245 (App. Div. 1974) (case involving sale, by an individual spouse's trustee in bankruptcy, of a bankrupt's interest in an estate by the entirety); Dvorken v. Barrett, 100 N.J.
Super. 306, 309, 241 A.2d 841, 843 (App. Div.) (same), aff'd per curiam, 53 N.J. 20, 247
A.2d 674 (1968). The extent of the estate conveyed is the same regardless of whether the
sale is voluntary or involuntary. See 30 N.J. at 412, 153 A.2d at 59-60.
53See 30 N.J. at 412, 153 A.2d at 59-60.
-4Silver Bay Homes v. Herrmann, 128 N.J. Super. 114, 117, 319 A.2d 243, 245 (App.
Div. 1974).
5'See 70 N.J. at 259, 359 A.2d at 476. See generally 73 HARV. L. REV. 792 (1960); 58
MICH. L. REV. 601 (1960); 14 RUTGERS L. REV. 457 (1960); 5 VILL. L. REV. 154 (1959).
56 See, e.g., Zubler v. Porter, 98 N.J.L. 444, 446-47, 120 A. 194, 195-96 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1923); Wortendyke v. Rayot, 88 N.J. Eq. 331, 332-33, 102 A. 2, 3 (Ct. Err. & App.
1917); Schulz v. Ziegler, 80 N.J. Eq. 199, 201-02, 83 A. 968, 969 (Ct. Err. & App. 1912);
Bilder v. Robinson, 73 N.J. Eq. 169, 172--75, 67 A. 828, 829-31 (Ch. 1907).
51 See 30 N.J. at 412, 153 A.2d at 59-60. In deciding that the right of survivorship
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extent to which an individual spouse's interest in an estate by the
entirety might be conveyed unilaterally, it did not resolve the inconsistency which has long existed with respect to the forms of relief
available to those persons denominated tenants in common of the es58
tate for the joint lives of the spouses.
Historically, neither a partition nor an accounting was available
between tenants by the entirety. 59 Partition was unavailable since
conceptually neither spouse owned an individual share, both being
seized of the entire estate; 60 at the same time, the husband's common
law right to complete use and control of his wife's realty effectively
precluded her from seeking an accounting. 6 1 Although partition is
still unavailable between tenants by the entirety, 62 spouses are now
accountable, inter se, for the rents and profits generated by property
held by the entirety. 63 Such an accounting may be had between
spouses because a husband and wife, holding by the entirety, are
64
regarded as tenants in common of the estate for their joint lives.
could be alienated, the King court addressed an issue that had been avoided by a
number of courts since Buttlar first held that the Married Women's Property Act and
tenancy by the entirety could coexist in New Jersey. See notes 38-42 supra and accompanying text.
58 See generally Silver Bay Homes v. Herrmann, 128 N.J. Super. 114, 119, 319 A.2d
243, 246 (App. Div. 1974). For a discussion of this problem, see notes 75-77 infra and
accompanying text.
59 Den ex dem. Wyckoff v. Gardner, 20 N.J.L. 556, 562 (Sup. Ct. 1846) (estates by
the entirety are not partible and a husband enjoys use and control during his life); Den
ex dem. Hardenbergh v. Hardenbergh, 10 N.J.L. 42, 46 (Sup. Ct. 1828) (partition not
available between tenants by the entirety).
60 Den ex dem. Wyckoff v. Gardner, 20 N.J.L. 556, 562. (Sup. Ct. 1846); Den ex dem.
Hardenbergh v. Hardenbergh, 10 N.J.L. 42, 45-46 (Sup. Ct. 1828).
61See Den ex deni. Wyckoff v. Gardner, 20 N.J.L. 556, 558, 562 (Sup. Ct. 1846). For
a discussion of husband's possessory rights at common law, see notes 18-21 supra and
accompanying text.
62
See Dvorken v. Barrett, 100 N.J. Super. 306, 309, 241 A.2d 841, 843 (App. Div.),
aff'd per curiam, 53 N.J. 20, 247 A.2d 674 (1968); Lawrence v. Lawrence, 79 N.J. Super.
25, 32, 190 A.2d 206, 209 (App. Div. 1963). Since Gery v. Gery, 113 N.J. Eq. 59, 64-65,
166 A. 108, 110 (Ct. Err. & App. 1933), it has been settled that husband and wife max
not have partition of a tenancy by the entirety. In Gery, a spouse sought partition of the
joint life estate. Id. at 60, 62, 166 A. at 108-09. In denying the requested partition, id. at
65, 166 A. at 110, the court noted that although the Married Women's Property Act had
changed the nature of the possessory interests of husband and wife, see id. at 62-63, 166
A. at 109-10, the "fundamental characteristic that each spouse is seized of the whole or
the entirety and not of a share, moiety or divisible part" had not changed or been
abolished, id. at 64, 166 A. at 110. For a discussion of the Gery case, see note 106 infra.
63
E.g., Neubeck v. Neubeck, 94 N.J. Eq. 167, 169, 119 A. 26, 27 (Ct. Err. & App.
1922); O'Connell v. O'Connell, 93 N.J. Eq. 603, 605-06, 117 A. 634, 634-35 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1922); Lohmann v. Lohmann, 50 N.J. Super. 37, 50, 141 A.2d 84, 92 (App. Div.
1958). See also Kip v. Kip, 33 N.J. Eq. 213, 215-16 (Ch. 1880).
64
E.g., Neubeck v. Neubeck, 94 N.J. Eq. 167, 168-69, 119 A. 26, 27 (Ct. Err. & App.
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The successor to the interest of a conveying spouse, if excluded from
possession, also may obtain an accounting for a proportional share of
the rents and profits of the joint life estate.6 5 Whether a third party
may be entitled to a partition of the estate is a more difficult question,
since he is merely a successor in interest to a party who himself could
66
not have obtained such a remedy.
New Jersey's approach to this question may be traced to the
1907 case of Bilder v. Robinson. 6 7 In Bilder, a purchaser at an execution sale of a debtor-husband's " 'right, title and interest' " in property held by the entirety brought a bill in the court of chancery seeking an accounting as well as the appointment of a receiver to collect
and pay the rents due to the purchaser and the wife, as tenants in
common. 68 After granting the requested relief, the court, without citing any authority, stated that had partition of the estate for the joint
lives of the spouses been sought, such relief would also have been
granted. 69
The Bilder dictum was subsequently adopted, albeit unacknowledged, by the court of errors and appeals in Schulz v. Ziegler.70 In
Schulz, a father had conveyed his interest in an estate held by the
entirety to his daughter who sought partition of the estate by virtue
of her status as a tenant in common with the grantor's wife. 71 After

1922); O'Connell v. O'Connell, 93 N.J. Eq. 603, 605-06, 117 A. 634, 634-35 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1922); Lohmann v. Lohmann, 50 N.J. Super. 37, 46-50, 141 A.2d 84, 89-92 (App.
Div. 1958).
65 See Bilder v. Robinson, 73 N.J. Eq. 169, 175-77, 67 A. 828, 830-31 (Ch. 1907).
Exclusion or ouster is a necessary precondition to an accounting between cotenants.
Izard v. Bodine, 11 N.J. Eq. 403, 406 (Ch. 1857). Since each cotenant has an equal right
to possession, he is not liable to his cotenant for his use of the property, unless he
actually excludes him. Id.; 2 W. WALSH, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 128, at 50-51
(1947). Exclusion or ouster need not be physical, since it is sufficient that the circumstances attending the sole possession by one cotenant "evince a claim of exclusive right
and denial of the right of the other tenant to participate in the profits." Lohmann v.
Lohmann, 50 N.J. Super. 37, 49, 141 A.2d 84, 91 (App. Div. 1958).
66 Although not available between tenants by the entirety, see notes 54-57 supra
and accompanying text, partition of the joint life estate has been granted to third-party
transferees of an individual spouse's interest in an estate held by the entirety. See
Schulz v. Ziegler, 80 N.J. Eq. 199, 201-02, 83 A. 968, 969 (Ct. Err. & App. 1912). The
Schulz holding, however, has been criticized and its viability questioned. See Silver
Bay Homes v. Herrmann, 128 N.J. Super. 114, 119, 319 A.2d 243, 246 (App. Div. 1974).
For a further discussion of the Silver Bay court's criticism of the Schulz holding, see
notes 70-72 infra and accompanying text.
67 73 N.J. Eq. 169, 67 A. 828 (Ch. 1907).
68 Id. at 170-71, 175, 67 A. 829-30.
69 Id. at 17,5--76, 67 A. at 831 (dictum).
70 80 N.J. Eq. 199, 83 A. 968 (Ct. Err. & App. 1912).
71 Id. at 199-200, 202, 83 A. at 968-69.
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affirming the lower court's granting of partition of the joint life
estate,72 the court held "that partition may be had between such
purchaser and the [remaining spouse] of this tenancy in common . . .
' 73
without affecting in any way the common law right of survivorship.
Significantly, the court stated that a husband and wife were "essentially" tenants in common of the estate for their joint lives and, as a
result, either could transfer his or her interest to a third party, with
the transferee becoming a tenant in common with the non-conveying
spouse. 74

The Schlz holding was subsequently questioned in Silver Bay
Homes v. Herrmann.75 Judge Kolovsk,, speaking for a unanimous appellate division court in Silver Bay, stated that while the court considered itself bound by the holding in Sclz, it "slaw] no justification for the rule which gives the purchaser of the husband's interest
greater rights than those which the husband possessed." 76 Notwithstanding such a fundamental disagreement with the controlling precedent, the court granted the requested partition of the estate for the
77
joint lives of the husband and wife.
The issue of whether the remedy of partition is available as a
72Id. at 201-02, 83 A. at 969. The court of errors and appeals affirmed, with qualification, the memorandum opinion of the lower court which had granted partition of the
joint life estate. Id. at 199-200, 83 A. at 968-69. The lower court had stated that if
physical division of the property were impossible, the property should be sold. Id. at
200, 83 A. at 968. The court of errors and appeals, however, did not affirm the lower
court holding with respect to partition sale of the entire premises. See id. at 201-02, 83
A. at 969.
73Id. at 202, 83 A. at 969.
74Id. at 201-02, 83 A. at 969.
75 128 N.J. Super. 114, 319 A.2d 243 (App. Div. 1974). In Silver Bay, the successor
to a husband's interest in a house owned by the entirety obtained a partition of the joint
life estate. See id. at 115-18, 319 A.2d at 244-45. Prior to this action, the husband had
been adjudged a bankrupt. His trustee in bankruptcy had sold his interest to one of his
prior creditors who had, in turn, conveyed it to the plaintiff'. ld. at 115, 319 A.2d at 244.
The complaint sought partition sale of the joint life estate. Id. at 115-16, 319 A.2d at
244. On motion for summary judgment, however, the plaintiff sought an order granting
partition sale of the entire premises. Id. at 116, 359 A.2d at 244. The trial court denied
the motion and dismissed the complaint. See id. at 117, 319 A.2d at 244-45. The appellate division affirmed the denial of the motion but reversed the dismissal of the complaint, stating that the plaintiff, if successful in its proofs, was entitled to partition of the
joint life estate. Id. at 118, 120, 319 A.2d at 245-46.
76 Id. at 118-19, 319 A.2d at 245-46.
77Id. at 118-20, 319 A.2d at 245-46. Although the defendants did not appear before
the appellate division, id. at 119, 319 A.2d at 246, the court, nevertheless, expressly
encouraged them to seek review by the supreme court which, as a court of last resort,
had the "power to change the rule of Schulz v. Ziegler." Id. (emphasis in original). For
reasons which are apparently unknown, the decision in Silver Bay was never appealed.
See Newman v. Chase, 70 N.J. at 262, 359 A.2d at 478.
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matter of right to the successor to an individual spouse's interest in
an estate by the entirety was presented to the Supreme Court of
New Jersey in Newman v. Chase.78 Despite precedent which regarded the right to such relief as an incident of a tenancy in common7 9 as well as the existing statutory scheme which permits, but
does not require, partition between tenants in common, 80 the court
denied partition in Newman.

81

Justice Mountain, writing for the

majority, 82

reasoned that where partition, which is essentially equitable in nature, 8 3 is sought by the successor to one spouse's interest in
a family home, "considerations of policy" warrant "that a court should
7sSee 70 N.J. at 262, 359 A.2d at 478.

79E.g., Drachenberg v. Drachenberg, 142 N.J. Eq. 127, 134, 58 A.2d 861, 865 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1948) (tenant in common has an absolute right to partition); Wujciak v.
Wujciak, 140 N.J. Eq. 487, 489, 55 A.2d 164, 165 (Ch. 1947) (right to partition is an
incident of a tenancy in common).
8
0 E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:56-1, -2, -37 (West 1952). Chapter 56 of title 2A is a
series of provisions which govern the judicial administration of suits for partition. Id.
§§ 2A:56-1 to -44; see Hotchkin v. Hotchkin, 105 N.J. Super. 475, 480, 253 A.2d 184, 186
(Ch.Div. 1969). Despite the equitable nature of partition, its availability in New Jersey
has been viewed as a statutory right subject merely to the limitations of the legislative
provisions. Golick v. Lukus, 89 N.J. Super. 467, 470, 215 A.2d 551, 553 (App. Div.
1965). The court in Newman, however, stated that "the statutory language is permissive
rather than mandatory." 70 N.J. at 263, 359 A.2d at 478. For a discussion of the development of partition as an equitable remedy, see note 83 infra.
81 70 N.J. at 266, 359 A.2d at 480.
82 Id. at 257, 359 A.2d at 476.
83 See id. at 263-64, 359 A.2d at 478-79. Partition was originally a legal remedy
designed to sever estates in coparceny, (a form of concurrent ownership "ar[ising] by
operation of law.") 4 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE

§ 1386, at 1014 (5th ed.

1941). The availability of the writ of partition was extended to tenants in common and
joint tenants by statute during the reign of Henry VIII. See id. at 1014 & n.7. Nothwithstanding this extension, the operation of the writ was severely circumscribed by strict
common law requirements with regard to possession and legal title. See id. at 1014. In
response to the inadequate nature of the remedy at law, courts of equity began to entertain suits for partition during the latter half of the sixteenth century, greatly expanding
its availability. See id. § 1387, at 1015.
In New Jersey, the equity jurisdiction of' the courts has been supplemented by a
statutory enactment defining and limiting the right to partition. See N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 2A:56-1 to -44 (West 1952), discussed at note 75 supra. There are cases which have
stated that a cotenant's right to partition is absolute and that inconvenience to the other
cotenant should not bar the remedy. E.g., Wujciak v. Wujciak, 140 N.J. Eq. 487, 489, 55
A.2d 164, 165 (Ch. 1947) (real property); see Hotchkin v. Hotchkin, 105 N.J. Super. 475,
480, 253 A.2d 184, 186 (Ch.Div. 1969) (personal property); Bentley v. Long Dock Co.,
14 N.J. Eq. 480, 489 (Ch. 1862) (same), aff'd mem. sub nom. Manners v. Bentley, 15 N.J.
Eq. 501 (Ct. Err. & App. 1863). In Newman, however, the court relied on the underlying
equitable nature of partition, "independent of statutory grant," in order to deny this particular form of relief in a case where there was a less onerous alternative remedy available. 70 N.J. at 263, 265-66, 359 A.2d 478-80. See generally Martin v. Martin, 106 N.J.
Eq. 258, 150 A. 338 (Ch.1930); Grassman v. Badgley, 90 N.J. Eq. 203, 106 A. 373 (Ch.
1919).
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be permitted to exercise its equitable discretion in deciding whether
or not to allow the remedy." 84 The court hastened to add, however,
that this decision should not be read to mean that partition would
never be granted to a transferee of one spouse's interest in property
85
owned by the entirety.
In denying partition, the court relied upon what it perceived
to be legislative concern for the protection of the family home, as
evidenced by the retention of tenancy by the entirety in New Jersey. 86
Justice Mountain noted that, in view of the absence of a statutory
homestead exemption, the equitable discretion of the court could be
employed to protect the assets of the debtor's family. 8 7 Although the
speculative value of the plaintiff's interest, standing alone, might not
have been a sufficient basis for the court's denial of partition, the
added presence of the possessory interest of the debtor's family in the
residential property weighted the equities in favor of the defendants,
requiring the denial of the requested relief. 88 Despite the denial of
partition, the majority nevertheless recognized that the plaintiff had
70 N.J. at 264, 359 A.2d at 479.
85 Id. at 266, 359 A.2d at 480. In fact, the majority expressed its concern that such an
interpretation might actually result in a sequestration of assets, unjustly denying creditors access to a debtor's property. id. Thus, it would appear that the defendants were
spared the consequences of partition only because the property involved was being
used by them as a family home. See id. Indeed, Justice Pashman noted that the use to
which the property is being put is of critical importance in determining whether or not
relief should be granted. See id. at 271, 359 A.2d at 483 (concurring in part, dissenting
in part); notes 91-94 infra and accompanying text.
86 See 70 N.J. at 264-65, 359 A.2d at 479. The court noted that while some of the
considerations which originally prompted the development of tenancy by the entirety at
common law have long since ceased to exist, see id.; accord, id. at 270, 359 A.2d at 482
(Pashman, J. concurring in part, dissenting in part), the tenancy "continue[s] to serve the
ends of public policy," id. at 265, 359 A.2d at 479 (majority opinion). The New Jersey
legislature has retained this type of concurrent ownership as a form of protection for the
family and its vital assets. Id. (relying upon Sanders v. Sanders, 118 N.J. Super. 327,
330, 287 A.2d 464, 466 (Ch. Div. 1972) (dictum)).
87 See 70 N.J. at 264-66, 359 A.2d at 479-80. Prior to 1952, New Jersey had a statutory homestead exemption. N.J. REV. STAT. § 2:26-110 (1937) (repealed Jan. 1, 1952).
However, when title 2A was enacted in 1951, no such provision was included. See 70
N.J. at 265 n.7, 359 A.2d at 480. Absent a more definitive demonstration of legislative
intent, the Newman court relied upon the preservation of the tenancy as well as its
statutory recognition in various tax provisions in deciding that it could utilize the estate
as a public policy tool. See id. at 264-65 & n.6, 359 A.2d at 479. Thus, by denying partition of residential property, id. at 266, 359 A.2d at 480, the court has used a tenancy by
the entirety as the functional equivalent of a homestead exemption, see id. at 265, 359
A.2d at 480. For a discussion of this analogy to a homestead exemption, see notes 107-10
infra and accompanying text.
88 70 N.J. at 265-66, 359 A.2d at 480. Despite the fact that Mrs. Chase had a right to
possession as a tenant in common, the court spoke in terms of the "family" interest in
balancing the equitable considerations. Id.
84
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acquired a legitimate possessory interest in the property8 9 and, therefore, granted him an accounting. 90
Justice Pashman, concurring in part and dissenting in part, 91
contended that an accounting as well as partition should have been
denied. 92 He stressed that the ostensible purpose of tenancy by the
entirety is the protection of the family home in times of financial
adversity. 93 Noting that one of the principal purposes of the federal
Bankruptcy Act is to give a debtor a " 'fresh start,' "94 Justice Pashman argued that by forcing the wife to render an accounting, the
89 See id. at 266-68, 359 A.2d at 480-81. Under New Jersey law, a cotenant in possession is entitled to contribution from his cotenant for certain expenses, unless the
cotenant from whom contribution is sought has been ousted from possession. See generally, e.g., Baird v. Moore, 50 N.J. Super. 156, 165-72, 141 A.2d 324, 328-32 (App. Div.
1958). Contribution was allowed in Newman despite the fact that there had been an
ouster, since the court reasoned that, where the ousted cotenant was receiving an accounting based on rental value, equity demanded a set-off of mortgage payments, insurance premiums and maintenance expenses. 70 N.J. at 267-68, 359 A.2d at 481.
90 70 N.J. at 266, 268, 359 A.2d at 480-81.
91Id. at 269, 359 A.2d at 482. Justice Sullivan also filed a separate opinion. Id. at
268, 359 A.2d at 481 (Sullivan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Although agreeing with the majority's decision to deny partition, Justice Sullivan argued that allowing
the purchasers of a spouse's interest at a bankruptcy sale to acquire a possessory interest
in a family home would "smac[k] of the bankruptcy sale reaching into the marital union
itself." Id. at 268, 359 A.2d at 481-82. He concluded that such a purchaser should "not
acquire a present possessory interest in such property" and, therefore, ought not be "entitled to an accounting." Id. at 268-69, 359 A.2d at 482.
92 Id. at 269, 359 A.2d at 482 (Pashman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
93Id. at 270, 359 A.2d at 482-83.
94 Id. at 270-71, 359 A.2d at 483. The "fresh start" rationale has long been the conceptual lodestar of the Supreme Court in its construction of the federal bankruptcy provisions. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934). The recognized purpose of
these provisions is to
giv[e] to the honest but unfortunate debtor who surrenders for distribution the
property which he owns at the tine of bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life
and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.
Id. (emphasis in original).
One of the principal devices employed by the Bankruptcy Act, If U.SC. §§ 1-1255
(1970 & Supp. IV 1975), to ensure that a bankrupt will have the ability to make a fresh
start is the express recognition by the federal bankruptcy court of existing state law
property exemptions. See id. § 24 (1970); Comment, Bankruptcy Exemptions: State
Law or Federal Policy?, 35 U. PITT. L. REV. 630, 630-31 (1974). Where, however, state
law allows creditors access to exempt property under certain circumstances, these exceptions to the exemption are effective in bankruptcy proceedings as well. See id. at 634-36.
Since the dispute in Newman arose as a result of a bankruptcy sale of an individual
spouse's interest in an estate by the entirety, see 70 N.J. at 257-59, 359 A.2d at 476, it
should be noted that, in those states which do not permit tenants by the entirety to dispose unilaterally of their respective interests, property so held is immune from distribution in bankruptcy proceedings to discharge the debts of an individual spouse, Comment,
supra at 643-44.
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salutary purpose of the federal bankruptcy provisions was undermined, 9 5 and that by granting such relief, an "additional burden"
would be imposed upon the family. 96 He concluded, therefore, that
"the same equitable considerations" which prompted the majority
to
97
deny partition should also have operated to deny an accounting.
In light of the fact that the denial of partition was predicated on
Mrs. Chase's use of the property in question as a residence for her
family,"' and noting the majority's caveat that a different case would
be presented if it appeared that " 'substantial assets' " were being
"'sequester[ed] ...
from just liabilities,' 99 the Newman holding
should be read narrowly. Although Newman has limited somewhat
the availability of partition to third-party transferees of a tenant by
the entirety, the rule of Schulz v. Ziegler which states that such relief
may be had, 10 0 remains basic law. 10 ' Thus, at present, the successor
to an individual spouse's interest in property held by the entirety
may be entitled to partition of the joint life estate, 102 but this remedy
is no longer "available as a matter of right."' 1 3 Rather, partition is
now dependent upon the equities of the individual case. 104
By conditioning the right to partition upon equitable considerations, the Newman court has penetrated the label, tenant in common,
9570 N.J. at 271, 359 A.2d at 483.
- Id.
97Id. at 269, 359 A.2d at 482.
9sId. at 264-66, 359 A.2d at 479-80.
991d. at 266, 359 A.2d at 480 (quoting from Way v. Root, 174 Mich. 418, 425, 140
N.W. 577, 579 (1913)); see 70 N.J. at 271, 359 A.2d at 483 (Pashman, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part).
100 80 N.J. Eq. at 201-02, 83 A. at 969. For a discussion of the Schulz holding, see
notes 70-77 supra and accompanying text; notes 101 & 106 infra.
101 70 N.J. at 261, 266, 359 A.2d at 477, 480. The Newman court, in reevaluating the
rule set out in Schulz, stated:
We now decide that although a debtor's interest in property held as tenant by
the entirety may be reached by his or her creditors, the remedy of partition is
not automatically available to a purchaser at execution sale or to a grantee of a
trustee in bankruptcy ....
Id. at 262, 359 A.2d at 478 (emphasis added).
Justice Pashman also noted that the rule of Schulz v. Ziegler would control in cases
where the equities in favor of the debtor's family were less persuasive. Id. at 271, 359
A.2d at 483 (concurrring in part, dissenting in part). It is not clear, however, whether
Justice Pashman would countenance the granting of partition in such a situation, or
whether he would limit the relief to an accounting. See id. The fair implication of these
statements, taken together, is that there remains a class of cases-those involving nonresidential property being a prime example-in which the rule of Schulz would continue to govern the availability of partition.
102 See id. at 262, 266, 359 A.2d at 478, 480 (majority opinion).
103 Id. at 261, 359 A.2d at 477; see id. at 262, 265-66, 359 A.2d at 478, 480.
I-oId. at 264, 266, 359 A.2d at 479-80.
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and has looked to the origin of the cotenant's interest. Where, as
here, equity and public policy require it, what is nominally a tenancy
in common 10 5 will be encumbered with certain incidents of the tenancy by the entirety from which it was derived. That is to say, that
even though an individual spouse's interest has passed to a third party,
the joint life estate will not be subject to partition, 1 06 and the purchaser
will be limited to an accounting' 07-the only remedy which would
have been available to his predecessor in interest who held by the
105 The concept that the successor to an individual spouse's interest in an estate by
the entirety becomes a tenant in common with the remaining spouse evolved from the
view, first expressed in Buttlar, that as a result of the Married Women's Act, tenants by
the entirety held a possessory interest in common for their joint lives. See 42 N.J. Eq. at
657, 9 A. at 698. While Buttlar implied that either spouse's interest in the joint life
estate was subject to levy, see id. at 656, 9 A. at 698, it did not equate tenancy by the
entirety to tenancy in common, id. at 655, 9 A. at 697; see notes 28-36 supra and accompanying text. See also Bilder v. Robinson, 73 N.J. Eq. 169, 67 A. 828 (Ch. 1907),
discussed at notes 62-64 supra and accompanying text.
106 70 N.J. at 264, 266, 359 A.2d at 479-80. In Schulz v. Ziegler, partition was
granted to a third party on the theory that she was a tenant in common with the remaining spouse, having succeeded to the grantor's interest as a tenant in common of the
estate for the joint lives of husband and wife. 80 N.J. Eq. at 201-02, 83 A. at 969. See
generally notes 65-69 supra and accompanying text.
Taking the holding of Schulz one step further, the court of chancery in Riccio v.
Riccio, 101 A. 426 (N.J. Ch. 1917), granted one spouse partition of the joint life estate
against the other spouse, id. at 426-27, equating, for practical purposes, tenancy by the
entirety with tenancy in common. This decision was overruled by the court of' errors
and appeals in Gery v. Gery, 113 N.J. Eq. 59, 64, 166 A. 108, 110 (Ct. Err. & App. 1933)
(by implication). See 70 N.J. at 261-62, 359 A.2d at 478. In denying partition between
spouses, the Gery court stated that to allow partition between spouses holding by the
entirety
imputes to an estate so held . . . the character of an estate in common in the full
sense of that phrase. Such an estate has many of the aspects of a tenancy in
common. . . . But the estate by the entirety has not been abolished in this
jurisdiction. It still exists, a sui generis species of tenancy with its origin solely
in the marriage state and retaining . . . the fundamental mental characteristic
that each spouse is seized of the whole . . . and not of a . . . divisible part.

113 N.J. Eq. at 64, 166 A. at 110 (emphasis in original). The Gery court did not, however, alter the Schulz holding with respect to the availability of partition of the joint life
estate between a third-party grantee and the non-conveying spouse. See id. at 65, 166 A.
at 110.
In Newman, the court has reexamined the status of one who succeeds to an individual spouse's interest in property held by the entirety. By making the successor's
right to partition contingent upon the equities of the situation, the court has distinguished the resulting tenancy in common from those tenancies in common which enjoy
absolutely the right to partition as an incident of the estate. See 70 N.J. at 262-64, 359
A.2d at 478-79. But cf. Goodpasture v. Goodpasture, 115 N.J. Super. 189, 195-96, 278
A.2d 531, 534 (Ch. Div. 1971) (in tenancy in common arising by operation of law right
to partition, unless waived, is absolute); Wujciak v. Wujciak, 140 N.J. Eq. 487, 489, 55
A.2d 164, 165 (Ch. 1947) (right to partition is an incident of tenancy in common).
107 70 N.J. at 266, 359 A.2d at 480.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8: 112

entirety. 10 8 While acknowledging that the successor to an individual
spouse's interest is a tenant in common with the remaining spouse,
the Newmian court has denied him partition' 0 9 despite the fact that
such a remedy has come to be regarded as an incident of the tenancy
itself. "o
New Jersey's statutory provision permitting partition between
tenants in common specifically denies such relief to tenants by the
entirety. 1 ' This statute does not, however, expressly distinguish between tenants in common whose cotenancy has been created by conventional methods and those who have attained this status by purchasing the interest of a tenant by the entirety. 1 12 While there is
virtually no question that the former may have partition, 1 13 the decision in Newman makes its availability to the latter a matter of equitable discretion. 1 14 Such a distinction creates, in effect, the functional
equivalent of a common law homestead exemption 115 in the sense
108 See Silver Bay Homes v. Herrmann, 128 N.J. Super. at 119, 319 A.2d at 246. For

a further discussion of the remedies traditionally available in this context, see notes
59-77 supra and accompanying text.
109 70 N.J. at 261, 359 A.2d at 477.
110
See Goodpasture v. Goodpasture, 115 N.J. Super. 189, 195, 278 A.2d 531, 534
(Ch.Div. 1971); Wujciak v. Wujciak, 140 N.J. Eq. 487, 489, 55 A.2d 164, 165 (Ch.1947).
"I See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:56-1 (West 1952). Section 2A:56-1 defines the terminology used in chapter 56 of title 2A which governs the administration of partition
suits. Cotenant is defined as "a tenant in common, joint tenant of coparcener, but not a
tenant by the entirety." Id. (emphasis added). For a discussion of the provisions of
chapter 56, see note 80 supra and accompanying text.
112 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:56-1 (West 1952).

113 See cases cited note 110 supra.
114 70 N.J. at 264-66, 359 A.2d at 479-80.
115 Id. at 265 , 359 A.2d at 480. A homestead exemption is a statutory device employed in most American jurisdictions to protect selected assets from the claims of creditors. See Haskins, Homestead Exemptions, 63 HARV. L. REX'. 1289, 1289-90 (1950).
Although the quantum and character of the property protected vary widely among the
jurisdictions, all exemptions appear to share a common objective: protection of the family unit. Id. Aside from the obvious benefits for the family in terms of security and comfort, a concomitant public benefit is presumed to flow from the fact that the family, being
saved from destitution, does not become a public charge. See 70 N.J. at 265, 359 A.2d
at 480; Haskins, supra at 1289.
In reference to the operation of homestead exemptions generally, Professor Haskins
has noted that
[t]he policy of the homestead laws is reflected in the three principal consequences .. .which follow when particular property constitutes a homestead: (1)
the property is exempt from execution for certain kinds of debts; (2) the owner's
freedom of disposition is limited, since the consent of the spouse is required for
a conveyance or encumbrance of the property; and (3) the use of the property,
after the owner's death, is regulated for the benefit of his family.
Id. at 1290 (footnote omitted).
The Newman court acknowledged the fact that New Jersey, which no longer has a
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that creditors of an individual spouse are prevented from disturbing
the possessory interests of either spouse in residential property held
by the entirety." 16
This decision to protect the possessory interest in residential
property held by the entirety from the reach of the creditors of an
individual spouse is particularly significant in that the amount of
real property which spouses may hold as tenants by the entirety is unlimited."17 In contrast to the decision in Newman, those jurisdictions providing a homestead exemption by constitution or
statute generally limit the amount of real property which may be
protected. 118
statutory homestead exemption, see note 81 supra, employs tenancy by the entirety,
with its indestructible right of survivorship, to limit effectively a spouse's right unilaterally to alienate his or her interest. See 70 N.J. at 264-65, 359 A.2d at 479-80. By limiting
the remedies available to the successor to an individual spouse's interest in an estate by
the entirety, the court has also attempted to restrict the rights of creditors to reach property held by the entirety. See id. at 264-66, 359 A.2d at 479-80. Moreover, by conditioning its decision to exempt property from partition on the basis of' its residential character, the court has adopted a typical precondition to the establishment of a homestead
exemption, see id. at 265-66, 359 A.2d at 480, specifically, "that the property be occupied and used as a residence." Haskins, supra at 1293.
6
1i See 70 N.J. at 265-66, 359 A.2d at 480. See also id. at 270-71, 359 A.2d at 48283 (Pashman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Statutory or constitutional
"[e]xemption[s] . . . generally prevent creditors from interfering with debtors' property
interests in exempt assets. Debtors retain all rights of ownership of exempt property
-their rights to possess, sell, encumber, and use the property." Vukowich, Debtor's
Exemption Rights, 62 GEO. L.J. 779, 792 (1974).
While the Newman court was not this specific in affording homestead status to the
residential property in question, its "family home" approach is consonant with that
taken in jurisdictions which have statutory homestead exemptions. Compare 70 N.J. at
264, 266, 359 A.2d at 479-80 with cases cited in Vukowich, supra at 784 n.23. In justifying the existence of such provisions, the focus frequently has been expanded beyond
the debtor himself and "many courts have emphasized that the laws are designed to
protect the family of the debtor." Vukowich, supra at 784.
"7 70 N.J. at 266, 359 A.2d at 480; Comment, supra note 87, at 653.
Il8 Haskins, supra note 115, at 1291. Typically, limitations are stated in terms of
dollar value, land area, or some combination of the two. Id.
Debtor's exemptions, of which homestead is one class, vary widely in terms of the
type of property which is protected from creditor's claims. Connecticut, for example,
provides a statutory exemption for personal property which includes, inter alia, household furniture, military paraphernalia, and limited quantities of livestock, foodstuffs and
commercial fishing equipment. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5-352 (West Cum. Supp.
1977). Prior to the 1951 statutory revision, New Jersey exempted residential real property in the amount of $1,000. See N.J. REV. STAT. § 2:26-110 (1937) (repealed Jan. 1,
1952); 70 N.J. at 265 & n.7, 359 A.2d at 480. Texas has an unusual homestead exemption
in that, by constitution, a debtor may elect to exempt either business or residential
property. See TEX. CONST. art. X\I, § 51.
The dollar value type of limitation, often employed in exemption statutes, is deficient since such an arbitrary limitation fails to keep pace with the economic realities of
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Lacking specific guidance from the legislature, the court in
Newman has attempted to strike a balance between the countervailing considerations of protecting a debtor's family and enforcing creditors' rights.1 19 Although the court has achieved an equitable result in
this particular case,' 2 0 such an ad hoc limitation on the rights of creditors and those purchasing at an execution or bankruptcy sale is certain to have an unsettling effect upon the traditional use of residential
property as a basis for obtaining credit.121 If it is desirable that New
Jersey have some type of real property exemption, it is indisputable
that ascertainable standards are needed. 122 The judicial branch is
modern life and, in effect, protects only a small portion of an individual's assets. See,
e.g., N.H. REX'. STAT. ANN. § 480:1 (Supp. 1975) (exemption of $2,500 worth of homestead); N.Y. Cix. PRAC. L. § 5206 (McKinney Curn. Snpp. 1976-77) (exemption of improved real property used as a residence not exceeding $2,000 in value). Unfortunately,
those jurisdictions which have attempted to keep their provisions current, are confronted by the fact that even substantial dollar amounts of exempt real property may not
adequately protect a debtor family's possessory interest in its home. See, e.g., ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 52, § 1 (Smith-Hurd 1973) (statutory exemption increased to $10,000 worth of
improved real property).
A combination of dollar value and land area limitations seems to provide a more
effective type of exemption. E.g., ARK. CONST. art. 9, §§ 1, 3-5 (exempting from execution both rural homesteads (the lessor of 160 acres or $2,500 in value, but not less than
80 acres without regard to value) and urban homesteads (the lesser of 1 acre or $2,500
in value, but not less than 4 acre without regard to value, selection of exemption to
be made by owner)).
For a highly critical examination of debtors' exemptions generally and homestead
exemptions in particular, see Vukowich, supra note 116.
ii9 See 70 N.J. at 265-66, 359 A.2d at 480.
120 See id. at 266-68, 359 A. 2d at 480-81.
i2i The denial of partition in Newman occurred subsequent to the bankniptcy sale
of Mr. Chase's interest in an estate by the entirety. One might assume that at the time
of purchase Newman had some idea of the remedies which would be available to him
and purchased in reliance upon them. Partition sale of the joint life estate would have allowed him an immediate recovery; an accounting would not. Although the court may
have felt that this result was mandated by the policy considerations involved in protection of the family home, it is clear that a statutory homestead exemption, or a functional
exemption of the type which exists in jurisdictions which do not permit any alienation
of individual entirety interests, see note 94 sitpra, wvould have produced a result equally
favorable to the Chases and more equitable to Newman in the sense that he would have
been prevented from becoming involved in a situation where his perceived rights were
subject to change after the fact.
122 The creation of a debtor's property exemption must be preceded by an examination of the underlying policy considerations. As Professor Vukowich notes in his recommendations for exemption reform.
[tihe exemption laws generally allow debtors and their families to live in
reasonable comfort and to avoid impoverishment. This seems to be a worthwhile end and one which justifies some curtailment of creditors' rights. To the
extent the exemption laws help rehabilitate debtors without recourse to bankruptcy, they benefit creditors. Consequently, exemption laws continue to be
desirable today.
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"conspicously ill-adapted" to engage in the type of plenary examination which should precede a decision having implications far beyond
the dispute before the court.123 Such a prospective policy determination is, more properly, the province of a legislative which has chosen
to retain tenancy by the entirety as the preferred device for protection
24
of the family home. 1
Jeffrey P. Clemente
Vukowich, supra note 116, at 869. In the enactment of such legislation, however, the
primary objectives of maintenance and rehabilitation should be rigidly adhered to. In
Professor Vukowich's words, "the laws should recognize creditors' legitimate interests
by exempting only that property which is reasonably necessary for the support of debtors and not property which helps a debtor maintain a high standard of living." Id. at 878.
12 Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 634, 371 A.2d
1199, 1269 (1977) (Clifford, J., concurring). In discussing the issue of residential zoning, another area in which New Jersey courts have been forced to assume the burden of
making controversial policy determinations, Justice Clifford recently stated that much of
the current dissatisfaction with the administration of justice stems from the fact that the
scope of questions placed before the courts are often "beyond the institutional capacity
of the tribunals." Id. at 633, 371 A.2d at 1268.
124Criticizing the judicial expansion of creditors' rights in an estate by the entirety,
Justice Hall once stated that
[t]he technical aspects of the common law of real property are what they
are from ancient days, and generally they can and should only be changed by
prospective legislation if different conditions and policies of modern times indicate the desirability of modification. Until then, a court should be bound by
them ....
King v. Greene, 30 N.J. at 418, 153 A.2d at 63 (Hall, J., dissenting). Certainly, an argument for even greater judicial restraint can be made when the decision in question
involves a significant contraction of creditors' rights and expectations.

